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Abstract
This article compares digital arenas such as Twitter with the principles prescribed by the bourgeois public sphere, to ex-
amine how close or far these arenas are from Habermas’ original concept. By focusing on one of the criteria, the current
influence of elites on political debate, it discusses the Habermasian principles of general accessibility and non-dominance
of the elites as prerequisites for a functioning public sphere. This study finds that even though there are few access re-
strictions on Twitter and despite the fact that no one, in principle, is excluded from the platform, there is no apparent
elimination of privileges and the elites maintain their elite status within its borders. Methodologically, the article relies
on empirical research of hashtagged exchanges on Twitter during the General Elections in the United Kingdom in 2015.
Through the mapping of Twitter as a synthesis of dialogic arenas, it explores the elite-focused discourse and the vocal
actors in the stream, underscoring that the presence of the elites, even in an indirect way. Drawing on these elements,
the article argues for a reconceptualization of the normative perception of the public sphere, suggesting the notion of
exclusion is a complex issue that includes expanding notions of publics to also include those topics being discussed. Finally,
it focuses on the significance of journalism in relation to political dialogue and argues that the move towards less elite-
centered arenas largely depends on journalism.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of social media platforms was accompa-
nied by “a freshwave of technological optimism” (Loader
& Mercea, 2011) that underlined the potential of these
platforms having a democratizing effect on political di-
alogue, by providing open and accessible arenas. Such
democratic promise also caused a renewed interest on
public sphere theory, resulting in a polarized set of re-
actions, ranging from euphoric commentary on their po-
tential to pessimistic predictions of its democraticizing
force (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 10). Such approaches took
Habermas’ (1989) theory of the public sphere as a start-
ing point, regarding it as a guiding map for successful de-
liberation, as it offers the normative basis to study the
nature and the structure of the political debates within
digital arenas. This article embraces the same starting
point. In unpacking the principles of the bourgeois public
sphere, and transforming them into measurable criteria,
this work examines the extent to which current contem-
porary arenas are close to the Habermasian ideal, shift-
ing the dialogue from questioning whether the Internet
is a digital public sphere towards tracing manifestations
of the public sphere online, addressing the extent to
which certain arenas are closer or further from the vision
of a bourgeois public sphere which Habermas proposed.
This article specifically focuses on the criteria of gen-
eral access to the arenas of dialogue, on the multiplicity
of topics discussed, and on the elimination of privileges,
as the notion of exclusion is one of themost contested ar-
eas when it comes to the bourgeois public sphere. Draw-
ing on this extensive criticism on the concept, set against
the promises of inclusion which accompanied new dig-
ital participatory arenas, this work suggests that the is-
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sue of exclusion and inclusion is far more complex than
has been presented in the related academic literature. In
other words, any discussion on the inclusive or exclusive
character of digital arenas requires research not only to
trace inclusiveness in terms ofwho participates (publics),
but also in relation to what this participation is about, in
terms of the nature of the topics and the quality of the
dialogue. Finally, it focuses on the role of journalism and
its power to not only affect how political dialogue is con-
ducted within the digital arenas, but also to move these
arenas closer to the bourgeois model.
Habermas’ theory has been contested extensively, ei-
ther by criticizing its flaws, or by dismissing the concept
entirely as insufficient. Such criticism provides us with
two options: either to heavily oppose to the concept by
focusing on its lack of flexibility to adapt to different so-
cietal needs, or to regognize the value of the concept
as “a site of information, discussion, contestation, politi-
cal struggle, and organization” (Dahlgren, 2005, p. 148;
Kellner, 2000, p. 12) that enables citizens to “remain
plugged into the daily routines of democratic governance
and public affairs” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 114), and there-
fore tomove forward on its reconstruction (Fraser, 1990),
its reposition, and its redefinition (Allen, 2012; Dahgren,
2005; Kellner, 2000). Taking the second route, this study
adheres to the normativity of Habermas’ concept. How-
ever, it uses the normative aspect in order to consider
a model of the ideal public sphere that is independent
from the societal and historical context. In other words,
in considering a normative model of political deliber-
ation that builds on both Habermas’ theory and on
Fraser’s criticism of the same, it becomes possible to de-
rive from the normative model a means of comparison
for the contemporary dialogic arenas.
As such, this research aims to offer a different con-
ceptual approach from predecessors. First, it addresses
the potentiality of digital media to revive democracy,
a potential emphasized by both techno-optimists and
techno-pessimists. To do so, it presupposes that the pub-
lic sphere is an open, adaptable and flexible concept—“a
metaphor, which when it is materialized, may take sev-
eral shapes and forms and adopt multiple incarnations”
(Papacharissi, 2010, p. 119). This shifts focus from the
public sphere per se to its structural transformations and
on the factors that led to the formation of the public
sphere; in other words, that its structural transformation
still exists and still causes structural transformations of
the concept.
This article also builds an empirical approach that
moves beyond those taken so far (Dahlgren, 2005;
Papacharissi, 2002), and it contributes to the method-
ological approaches by tracing the pre-requisites of the
ideal bourgeois public sphere on Twitter. Specifically, in
mapping the presence of elites and arguing for the com-
plexity of the aspects of exclusion and inclusion, this arti-
cle proposes the following set of criteria in assessing the
public sphere online: the openness of the social network-
ing platform; the limitations on the discussed topics; and
the hierarchical form of interaction. It examines the pres-
ence of dominant elite actors, defined here as governing
elites as a societal classification which points to “groups
of people who either exercised directly or were in a po-
sition to influence very strongly the exercise of, political
power” (Bottomore, 1993, p. 3). While theoretically the
wider goal concerns the reconceptualization of the con-
cept, empirically, each of the criteria offers insightful ob-
servations on political dialogue online.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Habermas, the Public Sphere and the
Reconceptualization of the Concept: The Issue
of Exclusion
Habermas’ ideal version of the public sphere was a di-
rect consequence of the emergence of radical new ideas
that appeared in 18th century, characterized by Enlight-
enment values of equality, freedom, and justice. The
bourgeois public sphere that formed in this context was
conceived as an assemblage of private individuals who
formed a public body—a new stratum of bourgeois peo-
ple arose and occupied a central position within the
“public” (Habermas, 1989). The institutions that consti-
tuted this public sphere varied in many ways: in size, the
composition of the participants, the ways that the pro-
ceedings were conducted, and the climate for debates.
However, the institutions shared some criteria as well,
among which the preservation of some kind of social
interchange that, “far from presupposing the equality
of status, disregarded status at all” (Habermas, 1989,
pp. 36–37). Among these institutions, the 18th century
coffeehouses are particularly important: for Habermas
they embodied the realization of his concept. Thesewere
the social spaces that offered the opportunity for social
gatherings, for rational-critical debate, and ultimately for
the formulation of public opinion. The notion of the cof-
feehouses is equally central to this article, as they empha-
size the metaphoric essence of the concept, its flexibil-
ity, its contribution to the emergence of journalism and
to the enhancement of the comprehension of how jour-
nalism is defined, even in contemporary times (Conboy,
2004, p. 50; Örnebring, 2010, p. 68). They are also a form
of arena with specific premises, and these premises are
the basis for the empirical study here.
According to Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere
offered a guarantee of equal participation as there was
a process of transformation from the “subjectum” (in
a way, the subordinate) into “subject”—from the recip-
ient of commands to the contradicting opponent (Haber-
mas, 1996, p. 81). Habermas underlines in this pro-
cess a model of norms and modes of behavior, includ-
ing: a) general accessibility, b) elimination of all privi-
leges, and c) discovery of general norms and rational le-
gitimations (1974, p. 51). This model is evident across
Habermas’ work: for example, the German phrase he
used (Öffentlichkeit) which has become defined as “the
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public sphere” is partially consisted by the term publicity
in the sense of openness and access.Webster (2006) sim-
ilarly summarises the key features of the bourgeois pub-
lic sphere as having open debate, critical scrutiny, full re-
portage, increased accessibility, independence of actors
from economic interest and state control.
Turning to the topic of elites, Habermas’ theory ad-
dresses these in terms of the feudal powers of the past,
expressed through the notions of hierarchy, tradition,
and respect for authority (McKee, 2005). These feudal
elites were absent from the deliberative processes in the
coffeehouses. Habermas referred to them as “governing
elites”—a term that offers a societal classification, point-
ing to “groups of people who either exercised directly
or were in a position to influence very strongly the ex-
ercise of political power” (Bottomore, 1993, p. 3). The
connection with democracy here is telling: this approach
to defining elites has as itsmain premise that, for a demo-
cratic dialogue to exist, it must be in accordance with the
democratic principle that “power lies with the people”
(Held, 2006, p. 2), where “all members are to be treated
as if they were equally qualified to participate in the pro-
cess of making decisions about the policies the associa-
tion will pursue” (Dahl, 1998, p. 37). Within political are-
nas, past and present, this principle is expressed through
the “empowerment of the people’s voice” (Green, 2010),
literally or metaphorically. In Dahl’s words, this clearly
indicates that “all members are to be treated as if they
were equally qualified to participate in the process of
making decisions about the policies the association will
pursue” (1998, p. 37). From this, at least in principle, hi-
erarchy should be non-existent amongst themembers of
a democratic society.
According to this line of reasoning, the dominance
of elites in public dialogue has been regarded as a way
to weaken and undermine the broader participation of
the public. For example, the significant development that
mass media underwent in the 20th century led the con-
ventional political systems to embrace a media model
where political communication was transmitted through
elites within an “increasingly closed system” where the
audience was largely a body of passive spectators (Bruns,
2008, p. 73). Considering present day circumstances, we
could refer to the bourgeois property holders as ex-
isting in the form of bourgeois computer holders. As
Papacharissi writes: “In this virtual sphere, several spe-
cial interest publics coexist and flaunt their collective
identities of dissent, thus reflecting the social dynamics
of the real world”, adding this vision of the true virtual
sphere “consists of several spheres of counter publics
that have been excluded from mainstream political dis-
course, yet employ virtual communication to restructure
the mainstream that ousted them” (2002, p. 21). Herein
we shift from speaking of a non-hierarchical ideal, to-
wards something more fragmented, with boundaries be-
tween spheres of publics.
Along these lines, Habermas’ work has been heav-
ily criticized over the years, especially when it comes to
the notion of exclusion and the perception of the public
sphere as a singular sphere, which ignores the existence
of a multiplicity of arenas and publics. Acknowledging
this multiplicity of spheres and the need for their inclu-
sion would have reflected a “recognition of social com-
plexity and sociocultural diversity” (Asen, 2000, p. 425;
Susen, 2011). In addition, by ignoring the multiplicity of
arenas (and consequently of publics), Habermas’ concep-
tualisation underestimates the sociological significance
of the alternative (e.g., of publics). Fraser suggests Haber-
mas’ “single overarching universal public sphere that
is necessary for a well-functioning democracy” (1990,
p. 66), should be contrastedwith amultiplicity of counter
public spheres. She further argues that Habermas ideal-
izes the liberal public sphere by excluding several parts of
the general public and subsequently fails to examine the
non-bourgeois public spheres and their conflicting rela-
tionships (between the so-called counter-publics), which
were apparent not only in the 19th or 20th century, as
Habermas supports, but from the first appearance of the
bourgeois public sphere (Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1990).
Much of the criticism against Habermas followed
Fraser’s lead: Kellner (2000) for instance, underlines that
while the public sphere is “a liberal and populist cele-
bration of diversity, tolerance, debate and, consensus,
in actuality, the bourgeois public sphere was dominated
by white, property-owning males” (2000, p. 5). In a sim-
ilar vein, Milioni divides exclusion into three categories:
a) class exclusion b) exclusion of other forms of expres-
sion and c) gender exclusion (2006, p. 32).Milioni also un-
derscores the self-refuting way in which Habermas per-
ceives the public sphere because it violates the basic prin-
ciple of the public sphere: that of general accessibility.
Habermas, himself, engages with these criticisms and,
with reference to exclusion, he underlines that “from the
beginning a dominant bourgeois public collides with a
plebeian one” and that “he underestimated the signifi-
cance of oppositional and non-bourgeois public spheres”
(1992, p. 430).
Despite the criticism, scholars disagree with the com-
plete rejection of the public sphere concept—Fraser,
for instance, argues that it is preferable to reformulate
Habermas’ bourgeois model and develop an alternative
post-bourgeois conception (as cited in Allen, 2012). She
further proposes areas for reconstruction of the original
concept. Picking up on this line of thinking and by situat-
ing these discussions in a contemporary context, focus-
ing especially on digital arenas, this article questions the
extent to which new social spaces adhere to the same
rules and norms as the ideal version of the public sphere
that Habermas visualized, as well as the extent to which
these complywith the criticisms on the exclusion (as well
as the type of exclusion).
2.2. Twitter: An Opportunity for Inclusion?
Much of the debate on the democratizing effect of new
platforms has been connected with their promises of in-
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clusion, and of expanding participation. However, in this
discussion the notion of exclusion has been shown to be
much more complex. This turns our attention to Twitter.
Twitter has presented itself as an open social network-
ing space that enables Internet users to track breaking
news on any occasion (Bruns, 2012), with profiles that
can be public and unlocked and accessible to anyone,
registered or non-registered (Huberman, Romero, &Wu,
2008). Likewise, Twitter’s official website indicates that
there are more than 302 million users per month and
more than 500million tweets posted per day. This is rein-
forced by its strong journalistic dynamic (Dagoula, 2017),
and by the fact that Twitter could be considered an am-
bient news environment, an arena that always contains
news, or an “awareness system” in which news infor-
mation is received in the periphery of users’ awareness
and does not require their cognitive attention (Hermida,
2010, p. 301), that “creates social awareness streams
that provide a constantly updated, live representation of
the experiences, interests and opinions of users” (Her-
mida, 2014, p. 360). Taking into account the perception
of the bourgeois sphere, in which the “circulation of in-
formation” was central to its existence (Fraser, 1990), it
could be argued that Twitter fits in this description.
On Twitter there are only a few access restrictions
and in principle no one is excluded. It is now considered
as an increasingly integral element of new media infor-
mation cycles (Nielsen & Schroder, 2014). As Chadwick
points out, in the new political information cycles that
exist within the current hybrid media system, Twitter of-
fers opportunities for non-elites to affect news produc-
tion through “timely interventions and sometimes direct,
one-to-one, micro-level interactions with professional
journalists” (2013, p. 89). Chadwick also notes that or-
dinary citizens are enabled, using digital technologies, to
affect the meaning and flow of information (2013, p. 89),
prompting a series of questions that concern not only
the effect of the non-elite interventions on the agenda-
setting, but also the presence of the elites (and the man-
ifestations of this presence) in the political dialogue that
takes place in networked platforms, such as Twitter.
To understand Twitter’s significance as a digital po-
litical arena, new mediated spaces need to be regarded
as internal parts of the non-digital world, which citi-
zens use and inhabit (Chadwick, O’Loughlin, & Vaccari,
2017), and where digital and non-digital worlds are not
dichotomized but interrelated. The full integration of dig-
ital arenas into non-digital ones indicates the existence of
an expanded global arena, where time and space restric-
tions are nullified, in a way that the McLuhan’s global vil-
lage is partly realised asmuch in terms of connectedness,
as in terms of awareness of those others in the village
(Dagoula, 2017). In this context, technology is regarded
as architecture—as the environment that enables users
to become civically engaged (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 10).
What is more, Twitter sits within a polymedia environ-
ment (Miller et al., 2016), where it is not an isolated plat-
form, but part of a multiplicity of platforms. Madianou
and Miller employ the term “polymedia”, an approach
that highlights that none of these platforms can be prop-
erly understood if considered in isolation – the meaning
of each one is relative to the others (2011; Miller et al.,
2016, p. 4).
However, this coin has another side, and scholars
have been arguing about the openness of the network
since its emergence in 2006. Research has shown that
there is a digital divide among Twitter users and suggests
that especially in the United Kingdom and in the United
States: “Twitter users are disproportionately members
of elites in both countries”, in the sense that they are
young, wealthy and well educated (Blank, 2017). Young
(2002) draws on Fraser and underlines that “in societies
with social and economic inequalities, when there is a
public sphere it tends to be dominated, both in action
and ideas, by more privileged groups. Even though ac-
cess may be the same for all, the greater resources of
wealth, power, influence, and information make access
easier for some than others. The interests, opinions, and
perspectives more associated with the privileged social
actors, then, tend to monopolize discourse in the public
sphere” (Young, 2002, p. 171). Fuchs echoes this argu-
ment by discussing “the asymmetrical power of visibility
on Twitter” (2014, p. 191), pointing to a dominance of
the elites (in a more expansive sense of the term) not
only in terms of followers, but also in terms of visibility
of their tweets.
However, when regarding tweets as “opinion-rich
sources”, it becomes apparent that although they may
not yet represent the society as a whole, they do give
a glimpse of a specific influential sector of society (Lutz
& du Toit, 2014). If perceiving social networking plat-
forms as aminiaturemodel of society, it could then be ar-
gued that the complete elimination of social inequalities
is rather utopic. Therefore, any reconstructed model of
the public sphere should seek as much inclusion as possi-
ble. Through the comparison of these platforms with the
bourgeois public sphere it becomes possible to evaluate
the extent to which these approach Habermas’ norma-
tive requirements. However, the suggestion here is that
inclusion should be assessed on another level as well—
beyond actors to also consider the topics discussed.
Asen similarly prompts scholars “to seek the counter of
counter-publics”, in “its articulation through alternative
discourse practices and norms” (2000, p. 428), and Young
suggests that counter-publics “can have dual functions.
On the one hand, the counter-publics can provide sites
and fora for members of the subordinated group toraise
issues among themselves and discuss them, formulate
analyses and positions, as well as develop aesthetic and
discursivemodes for expressing their social perspectives,
autonomous from dominant discourses” (2002, p. 172).
Going back to Habermas, he highlights that all sorts of
topics were open to discussion as these institutions al-
lowed the “problematization of areas that until then had
not been questioned” (1989, pp. 36–37), pointing an-
other perception of general accessibility.
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Last but not least, the role of journalism remains cru-
cial in this discussion as inclusion (or exclusion) of top-
ics is connected with the quality of information, which
inevitably leads to the role of the press. Fraser (1990)
describes the public sphere as a place where informa-
tion, ideas, and debate can circulate in society andwhere
political opinion can be formed, an argument Curran ad-
vances by arguing that if by taking as a premise that “pub-
lic opinion is to be formed in an arena of open debate”,
then “the effectiveness of this will be profoundly shaped
by the quality, the availability and the communication of
information” (Curran, 1991). As Webster (2006) adds, in-
formation is also at the core of the public sphere and the
media are one of the most important contributors to its
effective functioning.
3. Methodological Design
Turning to the empirical study, the methodological ap-
proach relies on the operationalization of Habermas’ nor-
mative criteria intomeasurable qualities, so as to be able
to test to what extent these criteria are met on Twitter
and to further develop existing approaches to the evalua-
tion of the public sphere. It looks specifically at openness
from Habermas’ theory in terms of the presence or ab-
sence of hierarchies (and therefore elites), as well as the
openness of Twitter in terms of the same. It addresses
these by examining the nature of publics and dialogues
on Twitter, as will be layed out below, surrounding the
2015 UK General Election.
The starting point for this methodolgocial approach
is Bruns and Moe’s perception of Twitter as a synthe-
sis of dialogic arenas at micro, meso and macro layers.
The macro layer is defined by the hashtagged exchanges,
the meso as delimited by follower/followee networks,
and the micro layer represented by the reply function
that includes personal exchanges (Bruns & Moe, 2014,
pp. 16–20). For this article, the analysis focuses on the
macro layer—and the hashtagged exhanges between
Twitter users. Hashtags are an integral part of Twitter, as
they manage to link conversations of strangers together.
What is more, Twitter is “more of a stream, which is com-
posed by a polyphony of voices all chiming in” (Murthy,
2013, p. 4), and hashtags act as “imaginary borders” that
delimit certain dialogic arenas. As Marwick (2014) put
it, Twitter research should be framed as a field site, to
avoid losing focus due to its extensive nature. Moreover,
hashtags not only provide a diachronic perspective, they
are also useful for identifying key participants in a discus-
sion (Bruns & Burgess, 2012, pp. 805–806)—in this case,
they allow research to locate the most vocal actors in
the stream.
The choice of hashtags is also important in purely
Habermasian terms: both the macro and the meso layer
constitute elements of the public dialogue, or as Bruns
and Moe note “they encompass a certain degree of pub-
licness” (2014, pp. 16-20). Moreover, the use of hashtags
at the macro layer can “aid the rapid assembly of ad hoc
issue publics” (2014, p. 18), especially when tweets are
marked by a topical hashtag, as “tweeting to a topical
hashtag resembles a speech at a public gathering...of par-
ticipants who do not necessarily know each other, but
have been brought together by a shared theme, interest
or concern” (Bruns & Moe, 2014, p. 18). Here attention
to hashtags relates, in a sense, to social gatherings remi-
niscent of coffeehouses.
Focusing on the General Elections in the United King-
dom that took place on 7 May 2015, the Twitter data
gathered includes tweets, using hashtags, posted from
30March 2015 (the dissolution of Parliament) to 31May
2015 (24 days after the elections). This focuses on the
period of heightened political interest. Tweets using the
two most popular hashtags were collected; these were
#GE2015 and #GE15 (https://www.hanovercomms.com).
After filtering and removing duplicates, the total sam-
ple for each hashtag and tweets consists of 149,287 and
95,629, respectively, collected using Tags 6.0 software.
This software uses Twitter’s Application Programming In-
terface (API), which can be used for tracking current ac-
tivity by users or of specific keywords (Bruns & Burgess,
2012, p. 804). This research embraces Bruns and Burgess’
argument that:
The data [that emerge through the participation in
hashtag conversations] must be understood as a rea-
sonably representative sample rather than a compre-
hensive dataset of activities....Datasets in particular
are weighted considerably towards the most engaged
subset of Twitter users. (2012, p. 804)
The sample was analysed both textually as themati-
cally. Drawing on Mason (2002), who suggested that the
choice of documents is based on an acceptance of the
fact that they are meaningful constituents of the social
world, this research adjusts this claim to the Twitter plat-
form. To map the presence of elites and to be able to
trace the notions of exclusion and inclusion, this article
focuses on three criteria:
• The openness of the network: to be a function-
ing digital sphere (or spheres) Twitter should be
open to all citizens, without technological limita-
tions. Empirically, analysis examines the diversity
of users that participate in the discussion through
the hashtags #ge2015, #ge15.
• The restriction of the discussed topics: for a func-
tioning digital public sphere(s) there should be no
restrictions in the choice of the discussed topics.
Empirically, this is operationalized by qualitative
thematic and textual analysis of the tweets, which
facilitates the aggregation of reactions related to
the elections.
• The non-hierarchical form of interaction: for a re-
alized digital sphere(s), there should be a non-
presence of prominent elite actors. Empirically, fre-
quency analysis is employed, following previous
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studies, to highlight which actors and terms domi-
nate the dialogue (Papacharissi, 2014).
In terms of limitations, there are a few considerations.
Even though tweets were gathered on a daily basis, they
were collected in an asychronous manner, meaning that
deleted tweets may be excluded. In addition, Twitter
API restrictions set a strict limit for gathering of tweets,
as these can only be collected in a short time frame
with extra daily limitations (Puschmann&Gaffney, 2014).
Lastly, even though the scope of the present article is
limited to a specific national context, the focus on elec-
tions does not act in a restrictive way: electoral periods
are not only periods with high political interest, espe-
cially from a journalistic perspective, but in contempo-
rary societies where representative democracies prevail
they can also be considered the epitome of democracy—
they are those specific occasions that offer the opportu-
nity for participation in democratic processes. As such,
the choice to examine political dialogue, on Twitter, dur-
ing an electoral period, lies primarily in their significance
as a democratic condition. As Maireder and Ausserhofer
note, within social networking sites such as Twitter “a
public negotiation of themeaning of the political events”
is witnessed (2014, p. 316), providing a clear connection
with the Habermasian public debate and the principle
of publicity.
4. Findings and Discussion
4.1. The ‘Publics’
Drawing from the analysis of the accounts using these
hashtags, we can first look at whomakes up the ‘publics’,
including dominant actors and theways inwhich they po-
sition themselves in the dialogue. The openness of the
network allows for a variety of actors to participate in
the streams. However, the presence of Twitter users is
massively overshadowed by the presence of bots. The
frequency analysis on the collected material as well as
the sampling and filtering of the top 100 accounts show
that both streams are dominated by ‘the bots’ (e.g.,
@ge2015bot). Bots, as automated information transac-
tions, feed Twitter streamswith automated tweets, with-
out any human intervention (Larsson & Moe, 2015). The
following examples showcase the format of these tweets,
however, during the time of the analysis, the accounts
were no longer available:
• ge2015bot: vmg456: RT C9J: Tomorrow we have
the chance to make Scotland’s voice heard like
never before. #GE15 #Voâ€¦
• ge2015bot: BigTfromHalfway: RT theSNP: #GE15:
AlynSmithMEP highlights that the SNP will work
with others to be a pâ€¦
In the case of the first hashtag (#GE2015), the number
of posted tweets sent by a bot account was 13.4% of
the total amount of the collected tweets (19,985 tweets).
Likewise, in the #GE15, bot-tweets, 10.5% of thematerial
(10,075 tweets) are from bots. In the first stream, two
other bots are also feed the stream with automated in-
formation: the @UKElection and @Election2015, which
primarily retweet already postedmaterial. In all these oc-
casions, the accounts were deleted from Twitter at the
time of the study.
Turning to the most vocal Twitter users using these
hashtages, these account for only 0.3% of overall dia-
logue, a significant difference when compared to the
space bots cover. Qualitatively analyzing these accounts,
this echoes Gottfried’s argument that while Twitter is
populated by a rather larger audience, its most active
users are mostly of those who are politically interested
(Gottfried, 2014). For example, on the #GE15 stream,
63.2% of the fifty studied accounts belong to individ-
ual users. These individuals, however, also promote
that they are interested in politics in their Twitter bi-
ographies, and/or that they support a specific political
party. This mirrors the normative discussion of Haber-
masian coffeehouses, and the preference for openness
of standpoint, the consistency of which was primarily
by political interested citizens—the bourgeiois stratum
(Habermas, 1989).
The most striking finding, though, concerns the ab-
sence among these active, political, users of politicians,
political parties, and formal political actors, particularly
those who were contestants in the 2015 General Elec-
tions. Also striking was the degree to which journalists
and media are absent, with the exception of @politic-
shour and @ConversationUK, on the #GE2015 stream.
These results suggest the platform users have a clear
way to communicate through the network and to polit-
ically express themselves without engaging such actors.
This demonstrates as well how the potential for partici-
pating in political discussions on Twitter is open—where,
in principle, no one is excluded—and that there is no di-
rect dominance of the governing elites in the streams.
However, it does not indicate a low presence of such
actors—as they are present in an indirect way. For exam-
ple, elite accounts are not only popular in terms of follow-
ers (active audience), but also in terms of retweets they
receive (passive audience). These two indicators suggest
that the are in a central place in the platform.
4.2. The ‘Topics’
Another way of understanding publics is through making
sense of the topics discussed. Through the thematic anal-
ysis of the collected tweets, that demonstrates an elite-
focused tweeting, especially when it comes to the power
or governing elites. As expected, tweets analyzed mostly
included words related to the General Election. How-
ever, the thematic analysis demonstrates a low variety of
themes,whichmostly concentrate onmedia and political
actors, pointing to the question of inclusiveness on the
platform, when considered in terms of discussed topics.
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For instance, under the #GE2015 hashtag, David
Cameron is mentioned 4,999 times, the Conservative
Party is mentioned 17,786 times, the Labour Party
14,922 times, and the Scottish National Party 10,076
times. These findings point to a preference to elite-
central discussions, focused on politicians and politi-
cal parties, showcasing an indirect (i.e., without spe-
cific @mentions), yet significant, presence of elites.
As examples:
• 36% of people who voted, voted Tory. That’s less
than a quarter of public as a whole. This is not
democracy. #GE2015
• Look, the Tories won: it’s called a democracy.
I don’t like it either but violence and vandalism is
inexcusable. #GE2015
• Well done Prime Minister #DavidCameron. You
fought a good battle. #GE2015
• Nigel Farage says new #Ukip voter is young and
working class. But will he resign? #GE2015
• WOW. Even the exit poll underestimated the Tories
chances! UKIP got only one seat, without Farage.
What a great night for Cameron. #GE2015
• For those who blame #Sturgeon on #Cameron’s
victory: it’s called #FirstPastthePost You are wel-
come. #GE2015
• #Election2015: UK wakes up to Tory majority
#GE2015
• These protests against the final results of the Gen-
eral Election- it was a clear win- the Conservatives
won fair and square #GE2015
• Wow. Three party leaders facing exits today.
#GE2015 #GE15 @UKIP @UKLabour @LibDems
who will be missed?
Journalistic actors are also not included in the most pop-
ular mentionedwords, apart from BBC’s accounts, which
are mentioned 12,458 times, primarily in relation to the
BBC Debate, reinforcing the argument of “dual screen-
ing” (Vaccari, Chadwick, & O’ Loughlin, 2015), where
Twitter acts as a real-time platform that feeds com-
ments and reactions into the coverage of political events,
broadcasted by other media platforms. In a similar vein,
Jungherr (2014, p. 242) notes that Twitter appears very
receptive to media events, as the volume of the mes-
sages rises sharply in reaction to a scheduled event, such
as the debate of the leading candidates—echoing the ar-
gument that the Twitter acts as a platform where elite-
focused debate is taking place.
Twitter users, however, mention individual journal-
ists as an attempt to engage in dialogue with them. How-
ever, more often than not, these prompts are made
without a response, as journalists’ use of the reply func-
tion is very low; when used, it is used to engage in
conversation with specific actors: politicians, journal-
ists, other media actors, in a form of intra-elite con-
versation. Such an elitist approach has also been ob-
served when studying the tweets of media organiza-
tions: in the context of General Elections 2015, BBC, Daily
Mail, Guardian and Telegraphmention almost exclusively
other accounts belonging to their organization (e.g.,
@BBCElectionbot, @BBCr4today, @FeMail, @Guardian-
Witness, @guardianworld), journalists working for the
medium, and rarely politicians (e.g., David Cameron, Ed
Miliband, Nigel Farage) (Dagoula, 2017, p. 157).
Going further, a large number of tweets are pre-
sented in the format of political commentary, with users
presenting their comments in line with traditional, if
not exclusive journalistic functions; these include bear-
ing witness or holding power to account (Picard, 2014,
p. 278). This journalistic use of the medium reveals
users’ willingness to provide information or criticism
on the elites, on policies, and on processes like the
elections. This underlines a form of political expression,
with Twitter users commenting, opposing, and adding
their voices to Twitter’s political commentary stream, as
shown by these examples:
• 3) I argued beginning of April that a majority
CON/LAB needed to face down SNP in House of
Commons. Now CON listen to @PaulGoodmanCH
#GE2015
• @David_Cameron 0 hour contracts? I’m guaran-
teed 0 hours, how am I meant to build a future for
myself? It was easier on the dole. #ge2015
• This is David Cameron-The man who forced a Hos-
pital to open a food bank for sick children #GE2015
• 24% of the voting population voted Conservative
(37% of 66% turnout). Maintaining the current sys-
tem is morally bankrupt politics. #GE2015
• #BBC Forecasting Conservatives will finish with
331 seats! #Wow #GE2015 A huge victory for com-
mon sense.
• Lots saying ‘I don’t even know u anymore
Britain’...u clearly didnt know it before, or ud know
its basically a Conservative country #GE2015
This indirect impact or indirect involvement of the elites,
and notably governing elites, indicates a shift on the dis-
cussion on the democratic dynamic of Twitter. While pri-
marily the emphasis was placed on issues of inclusion
of different publics, it is now moved to the inclusion of
discussed themes. Twitter is arguably an open network
and in principle access is guaranteed to everyone and no
one is excluded, however, when observing closer, hierar-
chy (or, hierarchical classification) is still present within
its borders. Likewise, if the presence of the elites is di-
rectlyminimized (in terms of their actual participation in
the dialogue), this could not be translated to a complete
absence. Elites are not dominating as actors, but they do
as themes of discussion.
5. Conclusive Remarks
Young writes that “one of the purposes of advocating in-
clusion is to allow transformation of the style and terms
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of public debate and thereby open the possibility for sig-
nificant change in outcomes” (2002, p. 12). This article
discusses the notions of exclusion and inclusion in digi-
tal political dialogue in the context of the public sphere
theory. It argues that for functioning digital political are-
nas it is not only necessary to apply Habermas principle
of general accessibility and non-dominance of the gov-
erning elites, but it is also crucial that this openness is
reflected in the discussed themes—despite the simulta-
neous existence of particular thematic debates within
and across broader domains (Bruns & Highfield, 2016).
Twitter is considered an open network, acting in a way
on what Arendt describes as environment that “the in-
sider and the outsider alike have the ability to appear and
speak for themselves in political public spheres” (as cited
in Breese, 2011, p. 137).
The overall aim is to consider reconceptualization
of public sphere theory through the lens of normativ-
ity and the development of a model that will offer cri-
teria which can be tested within current arenas to mea-
sure the degree to which these adhere to the ideal public
sphere (Dagoula, 2017). Therefore, this research argues
for the reconstruction of the normative model, embrac-
ing Arendt’s appreciation that political public spheres
could be reinvigorated in the contemporary world (Zerilli,
2005). This discussion comes through the focus on the
structural transformations, which directly affect the con-
sistency and the structure of the current arenas. It also
comes through the analysis of public sphere’s dimen-
sions that allow the ideal model to act as a measure
for comparison.
This normative perception should also take into ac-
count the extensive criticism the Habermasian public
sphere has endured, and notably those critiques which
concern the notion of exclusion, and juxtapose these to
the digital promises of inclusion made by new social net-
working platforms. Regarding exclusion specifically, even
though the complete elimination of social inequalities is
rather utopic, the normativity of the model allows schol-
ars to aim towards considering as much inclusion as pos-
sible. As such, an inclusive normative model should in-
clude not only the publics but also the topics in its eval-
uation of a public sphere, both in terms of it nature and
in the quality of the discourse, which (contra Habermas)
is emotionally charged with a low degree of rationality,
as the examples in the findings show. What is more, the
research while focused on Twitter, considers its findings
as possibly contributing to a larger media ecology, where
Twitter is only one of many available arenas. As such, any
understanding, or revision of the public sphere concept,
should refer to public spheres, rather than to the pub-
lic sphere, taking into account the multiplicity of over-
lapping, unequal publics (Breese, 2011). Furthermore, it
should also reflect the “range of institutions, groups, and
media, that form public spheres of discourse, action, rep-
resentation, and criticism” (Breese, 2011, p. 134). Like-
wise, the elite-focused debate, even when in alignment
with the bourgeois version of the public sphere and its
attention on current affairs, should also reflect the multi-
plicity of publics and its interests. Naturally, this implies
that, for an inclusion of counter-topics, the inclusion of
counter-publics is presupposed. However, the findings
here highlight that the notion of exclusion is a far more
complex issue.
At this point, the role of journalism becomes very im-
portant. A more sophisticated use of Twitter by various
media actorswould greatly benefit the political functions
of the new mediated arenas. To return to Habermas, he
put the press at the center of his concept, by highlight-
ing its unique explosive power (1989) that nourished
the debate by presenting critical reporting and by sub-
mitting political issues to critical discussion. The press
was a catalyst for the circulation of information and
for Habermas was the “most eminent institution of the
public sphere” (Peters, 1993). In previous work, I argue
that Twitter offers the opportunity to the journalistic ac-
tors to have an essential role, either by echoing these
voices in their other journalistic channels off Twitter,
by filtering the information and promoting important
topics on the platform, or by positioning themselves in
the discussion and performing their journalistic practices
(Dagoula, 2017, p. 167). Or, in Dahlgren’s words, it is
necessary to explore “to what extent the media, by per-
forming their journalistic role, can inform citizens ade-
quately, put their responses into public debate, and en-
courage them to reach informed decisions about what
courses of action to adopt” (Dahlgren, 2005). Putting this
within Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, the press
is the force that should encourage the public(s) to act on
their conscience and capacity as citizens and not as con-
sumers, but also part of themachinery that could lead to
meaningful democratic societies, the premise of which
is an informed electorate (Papathanasopoulos, 2011). As
such, and to add to Fraser’s (1990) proposal for a recon-
structed normative theory of the public sphere, any new
approach should have journalism in a central position.
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